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Since the Noumea Accord of 1998, New Caledonia 
has been trying to build a nation in a society long 
divided by ethnicity (indigenous vs. immigrant) 
and politics (independence vs. autonomy within 
France).1 The Accord granted increasing self-
government, official recognition of the indigenous 
Kanak identity and development assistance, with 
a possible referendum on independence between 
2014 and 2019 if three-fifths of the members 
of congress support the idea. The Accord also 
prescribed seeking a ‘common destiny,’ after more 
than a generation of polarisation that reached its 
peak during the Kanak revolt of 1984–88. Today, 
pro-independence Kanak parties run two out of 
three provinces and hold 43 per cent of the seats 
in congress. But organised immigration during 
a nickel boom in the 1960s and 1970s ensured 
a loyalist settler majority who prefer autonomy 
with French guarantees of security, and similar 
immigration continues today. Moreover, the 
legacy of a century of colonial segregation after 
French annexation in 1853 has caused the quest 
for symbols of a new ‘national’ identity and ideas 
about how to ‘exit’ from the Accord process 
(via referendum or another negotiated accord) 
to remain controversial. The results of French 
elections in 2012, after local government turmoil 
in 2011, have raised the specter of re-polarisation 
after two decades of efforts at conciliatory 
compromise.
The Quest for Symbols to Represent a 
Common Destiny 
Louis-José Barbançon, a local-born historian 
who is descended from a French convict sent to 
the colony in the nineteenth century, sees in the 
Noumea Accord’s call for a common destiny a 
profound challenge: 
How can we convert the plural memories of  
the communities of the New Caledonian 
islands into a common destiny? How can we 
juxtapose and then merge [indigenous] Kanak 
memory, whose time dimension stretches back  
over almost 3000 years, with the memory 
‘stemming from colonization’ that dates back 
barely 150 years? The priority must be to recover 
the memory of the forgotten ones … and to  
exalt the duty to remember (Barbançon 2007: 1).
Barbançon himself freely admits, ‘My country 
is Kanak land to which we came’ (Barbançon 
2007: 1). Thirty years ago, he participated in a 
governing coalition of the Front Indépendantiste 
(Independence Front) and centrist settlers, but 
increasing polari-sation ruined that cohabitation, 
and the resulting Kanak revolt took the lives of 73 
people. More recently, Barbançon and others have 
helped to create adapted school textbooks and to 
negotiate symbols of identity for their autonomous 
country. He describes both processes as quite 
challenging, but he is one example of the many 
people who have tried to mediate between opposing 
political forces and to construct a common destiny 
by facing up to a shared but contested colonial past.
The Noumea Accord is enshrined in the 
French national constitution and in more than a 
hundred organic laws passed in Paris to implement 
it. In addition to delegating more powers of self-
government to New Caledonia and recognising 
Kanak identity in various ways, it prescribed that 
long-term inhabitants should work together to 
choose five identity symbols for their country: 
a motto, a hymn, images for 
banknotes, a flag and a country 
name. Local government Vice-
President Déwé Gorodé  
organised a committee, which 
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included Barbançon among others, that created a 
country motto and hymn, as the Accord proposed. 
But choosing a new country name and flag arouses 
deep emotions dating back to the violent 1980s 
and beyond. Indigenous nationalists call their 
country Kanaky, while most settler loyalists prefer 
New Caledonia, the name English explorer James 
Cook gave to the main island in 1774. Some have 
suggested a combination of the two as a gesture 
of compromise. As Sylvain Pabouty of PALIKA 
(Parti de Libération Kanak) told me, ‘There is a 
Papua New Guinea, so why not a Kanaky New 
Caledonia?’2
Settler loyalists, however, tend to prefer the 
term Calédo-Kanaky, suggesting a different 
priority. Both Kanak3 (derived from the Hawaiian 
word kanaka, which travelled around the region in 
shipboard and plantation pidgin in the nineteenth 
century) and Caledonian (which originally referred 
to Scots) are modern identity formations that 
resulted from colonial confrontations. Kanak 
independence supporters regard their term as 
inclusive, while settlers often see it as exclusive 
and prefer Caledonian. Each category contains 
many components, from nearly thirty indigenous 
language groups and hundreds of clans to over half 
a dozen self-identified immigrant communities, 
and the political divide over independence or 
autonomy does not always align with ethnicity. 
The issue came up again recently, after the 
Socialist Party victory in the French 2012 elections, 
when the new Minister of Overseas France, 
Victorin Lurel said simply, ‘The members of this 
government are interested in the future of New 
Caledonia, of Kanaky’. Some loyalists immediately 
read that statement as combining the two country 
terms and called it either a regrettable slip of the 
tongue or, worse, a metropolitan attempt to impose 
a collective label, instead of an acknowledgement of 
both viewpoints (NC 2/8/12).
If the country name is a challenge, how about 
the flag? In a sense, the indigenous ethnic identity 
is more coherent than that of immigrants or 
their descendants; by now, France has officially 
recognised the former in various negotiations, 
while the latter has at least one foot in Europe, Asia 
or Polynesia. As Nic Maclellan has discussed in a 
previous discussion paper in this series (Maclellan 
2010), many loyalists say they can identify only 
with the French tricolour, because it is their French 
citizenship that legitimises their presence in the 
country. In the 1980s, the provisional government 
of Kanaky created its own revolutionary flag, 
but some settlers regard that flag as a ‘terrorist’ 
symbol. Pabouty has suggested that Kanak have 
put up with the colonial tricolour for 150 years, 
so settlers should have to accept the Kanaky flag 
for 150 years. But the loyalist Caledonia Together 
(Calédonie Ensemble) party supports the Noumea 
Accord’s recommendation to seek a common flag, 
so they tried to merge the two flags. Pierre Frogier, 
leader of the conservative anti-independence party 
Rally-UMP (Rassemblement-UMP) (RUMP), which 
is allied to the French metropolitan Union for a 
Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire)(UMP) led by former president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, then surprised everyone by suggesting 
that both flags should be raised together for the 
Pacific Games of 2011 in Noumea. The Sarkozy 
government agreed, for the time being, and raised 
both flags over public buildings a year ahead of 
time. Frogier called his compromise an act of 
reconciliation. He also speculated that once raised, 
the Kanaky flag would never come down, and 
neither would the tricolour (NC 1/7/10). In effect, 
the two flags flying together legitimised both local 
loyalists and independence supporters.
That compromise did not quiet supporters 
of a common flag, however, and the French high 
commissioner had to ban opposing street protests 
to avoid violence. A few communes would not 
raise the Kanaky flag, so the pro-independence 
Caledonian Union (Union Calédonienne) threaten-
ed to bring down the cabinet by resigning from 
it. Local government president Philippe Gomès of 
Caledonia Together warned that his group would 
counter that move by resigning from the cabinet 
themselves. In early 2011, the cabinet changed four 
times in two months due to opposing resignations.4 
Critics worried that New Caledonia had caught 
the ‘Tahitian syndrome’, because French Polynesia 
had rotated its presidency ten times in seven years 
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among three leaders. The French parliament soon 
changed the rules in New Caledonia to allow for 
a grace period of 18 months for elected cabinets. 
The real surprise was that the flag controversy 
produced a new governing coalition between 
two former enemies, Frogier’s RUMP and the 
mostly Kanak Caledonian Union. Both Caledonia 
Together and other independence supporters (e.g. 
PALIKA) called it an alliance ‘against nature’.
Frogier accused Caledonia Together of almost 
crossing the ‘yellow line’ into chaos. He praised 
co-operation with the largest pro-independence 
party which, in the 1950s, had supported auton-
omy under the motto ‘two colors, one people’ 
before the regime of president Charles de Gaulle 
took away self-governing powers in the 1960s in 
order to control nickel mining profits, thereby 
radicalising Kanak politics in the 1970s (Chappell 
2004). According to Frogier, the ‘historical 
signatories’ of the Noumea Accord could now 
negotiate a consensual conclusion to the process 
of building a self-governing country (NC 
20/2/11). His new Kanak allies then proposed 
that the Kanaky flag be made the country flag 
right away, since local settlers lacked a flag of 
their own, but Frogier would not support that 
move. Instead, he backed the election of Rock 
Wamytan of the Caledonian Union as speaker of 
the congress, the first pro-independence leader 
to hold that post since Wamytan’s grandfather 
more than 30 years earlier. Wamytan remained 
pro-independence but said, ‘we’re making the 
necessary effort to mine the depth of what 
constitutes our Caledonian soul in its diverse 
origins [to] permit a better future for our 
children’ (MNP 3/4/11). In another reconciliation 
gesture, at the annual Accord signatories’ 
meeting in Paris, non-signatories, such as 
Caledonia Together, were officially allowed to 
participate. The committee also agreed to let the 
two flags represent the country for now, while 
they focused on more technical details such as 
development aid contracts and the continuing 
transfer of self-governing powers to the country, 
for example in secondary education and civil and 
commercial law.
Raising the two flags together was originally a 
temporary measure for the Pacific Games in 2011. 
France and New Caledonia spent a lot of time and 
money organising the event as a way to expand the 
country’s role in Oceania, much like hosting the 
Pacific Arts Festival a decade ago and becoming 
an associate member of the Pacific Islands Forum. 
New Caledonia won 120 gold medals at the Games, 
and French Polynesia was second with 59. A related 
event called into question the colonial borders of 
the country. In July, the flame of the Pacific Games 
was brought ashore on the outer island of Ouvea by 
a Sāmoan named Niko Palamo. He carried the flame 
to the chief of a local clan who had welcomed his 
Sāmoan ancestors in pre-colonial times. Polynesians 
from Sāmoa, Tonga, and Wallis and Futuna had 
once voyaged to the outer islands of New Caledonia 
and intermarried with the Melanesian inhabitants, 
leaving behind a Polynesian-derived language and 
the names of several clans. Roger Wamou, president 
of the local cultural area, said: 
The transmission of the flame by a Sāmoan 
here on Ouvea is an important event that we 
welcome with joy, considering our history. 
The population still has the feeling of living 
in confinement since the [1980s violence], but 
this flame shines on us [and] makes us respect 
ourselves … . We’re showing that our island 
remains a land of welcome [because] the 
path of the flame begins here for all of New 
Caledonia; it’s another history being written, 
starting here (NC 18/7/11).
Yet earlier, France had prevented neighbouring 
Vanuatu from taking over the uninhabited 
Matthew and Hunter Islands, which are regarded 
as customary resources by people in southern 
Vanuatu. The Kanak Customary Senate had said 
those two islands should belong to Vanuatu, but 
France wants to control the Exclusive Economic 
Zone around them (Willie 2010). Perhaps the 
Sāmoan visit to Ouvea was allowed, because in local 
settler discourse, Kanak are often said to be just one 
migrant group among others? 
Another issue that challenges the construction 
of a common destiny is returning indigenous 
artefacts from European museums. In fact, the head 
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of rebel chief Ataï, who led the 1878 Kanak revolt 
and was killed and beheaded by indigenous allies 
of the French, was sent to France as a specimen. 
Ataï became a symbolic martyr to modern Kanak 
nationalists in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Caledonian 
Union leader Eloi Machoro led an armed struggle 
across the centre of the main island, in part to  
atone for the role of his own ancestors, the Canalas, 
who had killed Ataï. Machoro himself was shot 
to death by a police sharpshooter. Rumours had 
long claimed that the head of Ataï was in the 
Museum of Man in Paris, so, in 2011, Chief Bergé 
Kawa, a descendant of Ataï, began to push for its 
return. A professor at the museum now says that 
his predecessor ‘did not want to waste his time 
and [therefore] said the museum did not know 
where the head was’. The professor added, ‘Human 
remains are national property’, but if the family or 
the territory wanted the head back, all they had to 
do is ask. Kawa has organised a support committee 
and demonstrations outside the museum. Appar-
ently, all that remains of Ataï’s head is the skull and 
a mortuary cast of the face, but Kawa says the issue 
goes beyond his family: ‘It is very important for 
the Kanak people, for their struggle. Today people 
speak a lot about a future together, but how can we  
make a future together with the people who cut off  
the head of someone who gave his life for the Kanak 
people? Returning the head is a sign of peace-
making and permits reconciliation’ (NC 7/7/11). 
The French government is now seeking a 
consensual solution among all the stakeholders.
Killings in the 1980s, such as that of 
Machoro, remain a painful memory for families 
on both sides of the local political divide. For 
example, 2011 was the thirtieth anniversary of 
the unpunished murder of Caledonian Union 
secretary general Pierre Declercq, who was shot 
to death in his own home. Along with Machoro’s 
widow, Wamytan is trying to organise a truth and 
reconciliation commission, like the one Desmond 
Tutu created in South Africa. ‘Speaking out is 
liberating,’ Wamytan says. 
We should know how Machoro, Declercq or 
[Jean-Marie] Tjibaou were killed. In politics, 
we cannot look in each other’s eyes and build 
a future if we cannot admit to each other how 
the Events5 [of the 1980s] unfolded and how 
they influence our way of running the coun-
try’ (NC 29/10/12). 
A general amnesty in 1988 left many questions 
unanswered. However, Wamytan was critical of a 
new commercial film on the Ouvea crisis of 1988, 
because it is based mainly on a book written by a 
French police officer and reportedly portrays some 
Kanak leaders unfavourably. Wamytan was not 
alone in having that sentiment, but charges of bias 
came from both political sides (Maclellan 2011).
The film, called Rebellion in English and 
L’Ordre et la Morale in French, portrays the conflict 
between Kanak independence supporters and 
French police and army forces on Ouvea in 1988. 
Kanak nationalists killed four police and took 27 
hostages, hoping to force negotiations. The crisis 
took place during French presidential elections, so 
the two leading candidates, incumbent Socialist 
François Mitterrand and UMP prime minister 
Jacques Chirac, were under pressure to show that 
they could handle terrorists. Police captain Philippe 
Legorjus tried to negotiate with Kanak leader 
Alphonse Dianou, but before the second round of 
voting, the military undertook an armed hostage 
rescue, at the cost of 19 Kanak deaths and those of 
two French soldiers. Chirac lost the presidential 
election, partly due to the Ouvea violence. Thirty 
Kanak captives were taken to prison in France, 
one of whom was Djubelly Wea. Angry at French 
treatment of his family and community, he would 
later assassinate Kanak leaders Tjibaou and Yeiwene 
Yeiwene for signing the 1988 Matignon–Oudinot 
Accords, a peace agreement that recognised the 
‘double legitimacy’ of indigenous and immigrant 
inhabitants in building the country and postponed 
the possibility of independence for ten years in 
return for development aid.
Rebellion was not allowed to be filmed in New 
Caledonia due to local opposition, so it had to be 
filmed on Ana‘a in the Tuamotu atolls of French 
Polynesia. UMP politicians and the French army 
condemned the film as polemical and inaccurate, 
and Frogier of New Caledonia even urged French 
Polynesia not to allow the filming on its soil. 
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Frogier said the movie came ‘too soon’ because 
the country was going through a transition to a 
common destiny. His new ally Wamytan agreed. 
Some members of the family of Dianou, who 
died during the final French assault, also opposed 
making the film, and pressure from various 
opponents caused the first cinema chain that had 
agreed to show the film in New Caledonia to 
cancel its opening. But Philippe Gomès and his 
Caledonia Together centrists called that censorship, 
as did PALIKA and the local chapter of the League 
of the Rights of Man. Gomès visited the filming on 
Ana‘a to show his support for the project. Many 
New Caledonians regarded showing the Ouvea 
film as an act of public education.
After heated public exchanges between its 
French star and creator, Mathieu Kassovitz, 
and some of his critics, the advertising poster 
for the film was changed from one that looked 
confrontational to one that emphasises the lead 
character’s struggle with his own frustration that 
military force had superseded attempts to negotiate 
a peaceful solution. Already in 1995, Kassovitz 
had written and directed an award-winning film 
entitled La Haine (Hate), which portrayed an 
angry young immigrant in a Paris ghetto who 
tries to avenge police brutality against a friend. 
The controversy surrounding the Ouvea film 
guaranteed that audiences were eager to see it and 
to enquire further about what had happened in 
1988. After a different cinema company acquired 
the screening rights, 16,000 people watched the 
film in the first two weeks, and requests for more 
showings overwhelmed the producers. The Ouvea 
tragedy, more than any other event, brought about 
the Matignon–Oudinot Accords which, in turn, 
prepared the way for the 1998 Noumea Accord. 
Kassovitz first visited Ouvea in 2001, making 
contact with the local Kanak community through 
a friend. He then read Legorjus’s memoir and, 
in 2006, he spent another four months in New 
Caledonia interviewing people before writing the 
script (NC 23/8/11), which was nominated for a 
César award.
Kanak actors in the film include Maki Wea, 
who plays the role of his brother Djubelly, who 
was killed after assassinating Tjibaou in 1989. 
Yabe Lapacas plays the role of his uncle, Alphonse 
Dianou, who led the hostage takers. A London film 
reviewer argues that Kassovitz’s film, while focusing 
on a hostage crisis on a small Pacific island, takes 
a global perspective, because it criticises not only 
French colonialism but also the West in general. He 
praises it as a successful action thriller and polemic, 
compares it to Apocalypse Now, and says it was the 
best film at the 2011 London Film Festival (Will575 
2011). A French blogger with opposite politics, 
however, calls the movie scandalously ‘caricaturish’, 
‘intellectually dishonest’ and ‘mediocre’ in quality 
(Creux 2011). Kassovitz argues that there would be 
no controversy about it if not for the ‘politicians’. 
Former prime minister and Matignon Accords 
negotiator Michel Rocard says the film is painful 
but fits the reality of the events. Legorjus agrees, 
admitting that some Kanak were shot or allowed to 
die after they had surrendered (NC 3/6/11). Kanak 
nationalists regard the battle and its aftermath as a 
massacre. A 2008 documentary film on the Ouvea 
crisis had already appeared on French television, 
and a Kanak theatre play has also portrayed it.
Maurice Tillewa, Mayor of Ouvea, said, ‘the film 
by Mathieu Kassovitz is part of reconciliation … . 
What will we tell our children in 20 years if we have 
nothing, if we have no support?’ (NC 17/4/11). 
Macki Wea described the first showing of the movie 
on the island of Ouvea as very intense emotionally. 
Local people arrived and left in tears:
But when leaving, people were liberated, at 
peace. Others have opposed the film saying it 
would reopen old wounds. It’s untrue, it hurts 
everyone at times, but it lances the abscess. 
The people most concerned, like those of 
Ouvea, left feeling liberated from a weight on 
their shoulders since 23 years … . It’s not only 
Ouvean history, it’s not only Kanak history, it’s 
also that of all New Caledonians and even of 
the French state. Thus it’s our common history, 
part of our common destiny (NC 16/11/11).
At the opening in Paris, Wea said:
I realised that we needed this film so that all 
of France would take interest in the Kanak 
people, and beyond that, in New Caledonia … . 
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The most powerful moment was the meet-
ing that we had, we the sons or brothers of 
the hostage takers and of those who were 
killed, along with the families of police killed 
or captured. There were victims and orphans 
on each side. I can tell you that many people 
wept’ (NC 16/11/11).
Kanak even invited the families of the police 
killed on Ouvea to the island, along with Legorjus, 
who hopes that the ‘younger generations will find 
the path to a real reconciliation’ (NC 23/8/11).
Yabe Lapacas, who is a law student and 
portrayed his uncle Dianou, said: 
The film has freed speech [because] moth-
ers and fathers of families … could now talk 
about the Events with their children and 
accompany them [to the show] … . Many 
people asked us, ‘Did it really happen like 
that?’ Yes, it’s the testimony of our elders. 
They said thank you. The camera of Mathieu 
Kassovitz was there, where there had not been 
a camera in 1988 (NC 31/12/11).
He encouraged people who watched it to 
discuss it afterwards: 
We learned our history, which we do not 
learn in primary or secondary school, where 
it is taboo …. . This film enables us to see our 
past and to move forward (NC 31/12/11). 
Young people have told reporters that the film 
makes people talk, ask questions, and is thus a 
step toward understanding the country’s past. At a 
public discussion, a young woman invoked the duty 
to remember: 
Common destiny is a great slogan. But the 
young generation who does not know its 
history cannot advance. If it does not take 
possession of its history, it loses its identity’ 
(NC 16/12/11).
Local historian Frédéric Angleviel says that 
what is missing in the diatribes about the Ouvea 
tragedy is the voice of the Kanak hostage takers, 
most of whom are dead. There are dozens of 
monuments, either in the country or in France, that 
are dedicated to the four police killed during the 
kidnapping, but only one, on Ouvea, is dedicated 
to the Kanak hostage takers. Local historian Olivier 
Houdan is leading a commission in Bourail to 
create a single monument to all the people who 
died violently in the 1980s and to use the term  
‘civil war’ to describe those so-called Events. 
Houdan feels that the period needs addressing in 
collective memory as much as the Algerian War 
does. The 1980s Kanak revolt has been taught in 
local schools only since 2008, in one hour of one 
course in the last year of secondary school, and 
only reluctantly (NC 29/10/11). Meanwhile, in 
2012, a generation after the French presidential 
election that sparked bloodshed on Ouvea, another 
Socialist defeated a UMP candidate and fuelled 
another shift in local politics.
Political Positioning to Achieve a Common 
Destiny, or Not?
The cohabitation of Kanak independence 
supporters and moderate loyalists seeking 
constructive solutions in 1982–84 was unable to 
stop the mounting political violence, including 
a settler riot that invaded the local Territorial 
Assembly hall. At the Nainville-les-Roches Round 
Table of 1983, France recognised the innate right 
of the Kanak people to independence, and Kanak 
leaders accepted settler descendants as fellow 
‘victims of history’, but loyalist negotiators refused 
to sign the final document. In 2004, moderate 
loyalists who had a more social democratic agenda 
than the dominant Rassemblement-UMP pulled 
off an electoral revolution, parallel to the victory 
of pro-independence President Oscar Temaru 
of French Polynesia the same year. The Future 
Together party and its offshoot Caledonia Together 
were at first able to dialogue with independence 
supporters, especially PALIKA, on socioeconomic 
and other reforms. Then in 2011, the RUMP–
Caledonian Union alliance at first marginalised 
the Caledonia Together party by pushing Philippe 
Gomès out of New Caledonia’s presidency, as 
a result of repeated party resignations over the 
flag issue that year. The new RUMP–Caledonian 
coalition proposed hopeful co-operation between 
two important political parties who had once 
been staunch opponents, while New Caledonia 
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sought a negotiated ‘exit’ from the Noumea Accord 
process. Unfortunately, pushing anyone out of 
the conversation has its costs. The small Future 
Together party’s association with the metropolitan 
UMP enabled Harold Martin to replace Gomès 
as president, but both PALIKA and Caledonia 
Together felt displaced.
In September 2011, voters cast their ballots 
for candidates to the French senate in Paris, where 
New Caledonia now has two seats. Frogier and 
Mayor Hilarion Vendegou of the Isle of Pines, 
whose ancestor was the first Kanak chief to sign 
the treaty of French annexation in 1853, each 
defeated a Caledonia Together candidate. The 
RUMP seemed to have perpetuated its long-
time monopoly of legislative representation in 
Paris. Frogier argued that raising the two flags 
had won over the pro-independence Caledonian 
Union, which did not ally with PALIKA in the 
senate election. The loyalist Caledonia Together 
leader, Gomès, blamed the voting system, which 
empowers a small group of urban ‘great electors’ 
to choose senators. His party boycotted a speech 
by President Martin, who predicted the end of 
political instability and a consensual outcome of 
the Noumea Accord. Gomes rallied small loyalist 
parties around his ‘common flag’ cause, claiming 
25,000 voters. But Wamytan of the Caledonian 
Union was now congress speaker, and cabinet Vice-
President Gilbert Tyuienon of the same party told 
the UN: 
New Caledonia, leaving aside majority–
minority logic, has decided to go beyond 
ideological oppositions by installing a new 
method of governance based on a sharing  
of power in the country’s institutions  
(NC 29/11/11).
Such optimism received yet another surprise 
when metropolitan politics swung to the left against 
Sarkozy in 2012. Dogged by austerity measures in 
the European economic crisis, the UMP leader lost 
the French presidency in May to Socialist François 
Hollande, causing some local loyalists to recall bit-
terly the Mitterrand era in the 1980s. Kanak pro-
independence leaders actually welcomed the return 
of their old allies the Socialists to power in Paris, 
and in the national assembly elections in June, they 
united and nearly won a deputy seat in the interior 
district of Grand Terre, where Jean-Pierre Djaiwé 
of PALIKA led after the first round of voting. But 
the customary Kanak abstention rate in French leg-
islative elections remained high, and in the second 
round, loyalists suddenly rallied around Gomès 
against independence. In Noumea, Sonia Lagarde 
of Caledonia Together won, giving that party both 
New Caledonian deputy seats in Paris and thus 
displacing the Rassemblement-RUMP from the 
National Assembly. Touting this shocking come-
back, Gomès reiterated his opposition to Frogier’s 
position on the two flags issue. He hoped to build 
‘a little nation within the big one [France]’ by unit-
ing Caledonians under a common flag, not under 
two that represented opposing forces (NC 14/6/12). 
In the year since Gomès’ ouster from the country 
presidency, his protest campaign against the tempo-
rary two flags policy had attracted other dissident 
loyalists besides those who originally supported his 
party platform of social democratic nation-building. 
Some belonged to local branch of the right-wing 
National Front, which had lost its Congress seats in 
2009, partly due to the restriction of the electorate 
in provincial elections and independence referenda 
to long-term residents.
Attracting such allies seemed to have hardened 
Gomès’ anti-independence rhetoric and created 
a disturbing sense of re-polarisation, just when 
consensual negotiations were needed. As for the 
Socialist victory in the French presidential election, 
Gomès said that economic stress in Europe had 
pushed a third of metropolitan French to vote 
‘against the system’, a nod to the National Front 
in France and also to his new local allies. In the 
election for deputies to Paris (in which the vote 
is not restricted to long-term residents), the local 
National Front did twice as well as in the restricted 
2009 provincial elections. Its leaders called that 
improvement ‘a sanction against the manipulations 
that have happened here with the [two] flags 
affair’ (NC 24/4/12). In addition, fewer New 
Caledonians cast their ballots in the second round 
of the legislative elections unless they were angry. 
The local paper observed ruefully, ‘the loyalist 
electorate does not want anyone to discuss with 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm8                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
David Chappell
the independence supporters except in a crisis 
[and] wishes a return to the logic of [opposing] 
blocs’ (NC 18/6/12). Frogier denounced Gomès’s 
‘radicalisation’ of local politics which, he said, ran 
a ‘violent campaign that has awakened old demons’ 
(RNZI 2012). Frogier lamented, ‘we have gone 
twenty-five years backwards’, and Wamytan, whose 
Congress leadership was now in danger, expressed 
concern that the concessions made by the RUMP 
might not endure. President Martin even blamed  
rising juvenile delinquency on the bad example set  
by street protests against the two flags (NC 18/7/12).  
After the new Socialist overseas minister mention-
ed Kanaky in the same sentence as New Caledonia, 
defeated RUMP deputy Gaël Yanno condemned 
‘taking sides’ with a pro-independence ‘minority’, 
which risked crossing the ‘yellow line’ into chaos: 
‘The Socialists, once in power, have not waited long 
to put into practice their electoral slogan “change 
is now” [but] we will fight any unilateral proposal 
that goes against keeping New Caledonia in France 
... it’s no to Kanaky! And it will always be no’  
(NC 12/8/12). The annual signatories committee 
meeting in 2010 had actually decided to raise both 
flags, but some loyalist politicians now accused 
Paris of ‘imposing’ it.
Paul Neaoutyine of PALIKA, who is President 
of the Kanak-run Northern Province, had been 
skeptical of the RUMP–Caledonian Union 
alliance. He said that tactical move against both 
Gomès and his own party had enabled a few 
pro-independence politicians like Wamytan and 
Tyuienon to acquire symbolic posts, but the 
loyalist backlash that brought down that fragile 
entente had reminded the independence parties 
of their own goals. PALIKA would ‘continue as 
before’, by negotiating with French parliamentary 
groups and the new regime in Paris to lobby for 
the fulfillment of the Noumea Accord, which 
promised emancipation (though the exact form of 
that is still open to debate). The annual signatories 
committee meeting, already enlarged to include 
Future Together, Caledonia Together and the 
union-affiliated Labour Party (Parti Travailliste) , 
was the agency ‘who will decide if we stop or not’. 
PALIKA, more leftist than the chief and church-
based Caledonian Union, was often able to work 
with social democratic loyalists, and the Socialists 
controlled Paris. Neaoutyine warned:
... the right wing as well as independence 
supporters who join the game started by 
the right, not to pretend that there will be a 
radicalisation, a return backwards of 25 years. 
They should not play on fear that we lost 
something. No, we are here to build. People 
must distinguish between deceptive rhetoric … 
and real political work (KOL 1/7/12). 
At the Bastille Day celebrations on 14 July, 2012, 
two different marches took place in Noumea. The  
first featured the French military parade in front 
of the Museum of New Caledonia to cheers from a 
mostly loyalist audience. The second was organised 
by the USTKE (Union Syndicale des Travailleurs 
Kanak et des Exploités) (Union of Kanak and 
Exploited Workers), the second largest labour 
federation in the country, which backs the pro-
independence Labour Party, in the name of ‘Kanaky 
2014’.6 Marchers went from working-class Vallée du 
Tir to the Mwâ Kâ, a totem pole sculpted by Kanak 
artists to symbolise the nation (Maclellan 2005). A 
loudspeaker mounted on a truck called out, ‘We’re 
not terrorists, we’re not dangerous, come join our  
ranks!’. A young Kanak with a raised fist told a 
reporter, ‘We don’t care about the common destiny, 
that’s an idea invented by France. We are  
determined, we will use every means to keep our 
[Kanaky] flag raised.’ Many participants mocked 
Gomès, and Wamytan said, ‘Philippe Gomès aroused 
the fear of independence and thus of Kanak. This 
march today lets all those who expressed their voices 
in the legislative elections to send a clear message’ 
(NC 16/7/12). Another speaker urged Kanak to 
register to vote, especially in the Southern Province, 
before the provincial elections of 2014 and the 
independence referendum (MNP 22/7/12). 
In August, Wamytan lost his post as speaker of 
congress to Gerard Poadja of Caledonia Together, 
whom loyalists rallied around on the third ballot 
to challenge the brief RUMP–Caledonian Union 
alliance (NC 30/8/12). Nevertheless, in late 2012, 
Daniel Goa, the new UC leader, advocated putting 
aside divisive identity symbols for now ‘to build a 
country’ (NC 29/11/12), and despite new divisions 
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within the RUMP, Frogier suggested, ‘To run 
the Rassemblement, you must have a vision 
for Caledonia and must be able to speak with 
independence supporters’ (NC 28/11/12). At the 
meeting of the signatories of the Noumea Accord, 
each party stated its views but also worked for 
consensus on issues such as efforts to reduce the 
high cost of living and the pursuit of educational 
and socioeconomic reforms to reduce inequalities, 
both with continuing French aid (NC 8/12/12).  
Conclusion
After significant decolonisation in the 1950s, New 
Caledonia’s destiny was reversed in the 1960s for 
reasons of French national prestige and strategic 
nickel resources. The lesson of the 1980s is that 
regression was a mistake. Today, everyone in the 
restricted New Caledonian citizenship of long-
term residents has accepted self-government; they 
differ over the degree of separation from France, 
that is, the specific details of sovereignty. The exact 
legal boundary between enlarged autonomy and 
full sovereignty, especially in a globalising world 
that compromises even French independence (for 
example, the European Union, or multinational 
corporations), has yet to be determined. In March 
2011, at a colloquium in Noumea that presented 
comparative perspectives on decolonisation, legal 
scholars suggested that so-called ‘reserved’ powers 
— which loyalists want France to keep — such as 
defense and public order, are not carved in stone 
in French law. Instead, they constitute bundles 
of administrative responsibilities, some of which 
are already shared, so the exact category of the 
country’s future status may be less important 
than the principles that local leaders bring to the 
negotiating table and find consensual ways to 
implement. Lam Dang, of the Federated States 
of Micronesia, said that the dialogue should 
start with what people want, and if an acceptable 
international law term fits or not, so be it (NC 
13/3/11). New Caledonia is already a sui generis 
country that defies classification. Complete 
independence is dear to most Kanak and even a 
few settlers, but a referendum between 2014 and 
2019 is unlikely to gain a majority in favor, given 
the demographic situation in which Kanak are 
now a slight minority. Compromises will have to be 
made.
Hollande, like Sarkozy and Chirac before him, 
has promised that France will accompany New 
Caledonia in its process of emancipation as far as 
local citizens desire. But concerns among settlers 
over juvenile delinquency among urban Kanak and 
supposed foreign threats (for example, China or 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ neighbours or terrorists) continue to 
make independence unappealing to many of them. 
Other key issues include continuing economic 
development and educational training subsidised by 
France and by nickel exports, and reducing the cost 
of living and the large income and employment gap 
between settler-dominated greater Noumea and the 
mostly Kanak rural interior and islands (NC 9/5/12). 
The visit by a Sāmoan flame-bearer to his distant 
Kanak relatives on Ouvea, the attempted Kanak 
customary granting of two islands to Vanuatu, and 
the ongoing concerns of the Pacific Islands Forum 
and Melanesian Spearhead Group show that self-
determination may also need to transcend colonially 
defined identities. Pro-independence activists and 
labour unions will likely keep up the pressure to 
move ever closer toward sovereignty, which might 
become a habit over time if the two sides learn to 
trust each other better. As they work together on a 
daily basis to balance indigenous dignity with settler 
security, and collective identity with individual 
rights, they may ultimately build a new nation. In 
the 1960s, Kanak priest Apollinaire Anova-Ataba 
regarded rebel chief Ataï as an apostle of liberty for 
all New Caledonians from colonial rule. If leading 
political parties can agree to raise two flags together 
because each accepts the identity of the other, 
political actors may yet come to accept alternative 
visions of a contested past and shared future. And in 
the future, perhaps, a Kanaky New Caledonia?
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4 The Noumea Accord specifies that if a party in the 
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